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THE NEW SCHOOLMASTER IN FINANCE*

Hiram L. Jomet

T

HE "A" income debentures of the Green Bay & Western Railroad
are entitled to 2 ¼ % before the other securities. Then the common
stock is to be paid 2.¾ %- Next, the "A" debentures and the common
are each to get another 2.¾ %- Finally, the series "B" income debentures are to receive what is left. Both the "A" and the "B" income
debentures were issued in r 896, but they are due only if the road is
sold or reorganized. In such case the class "B" debentures are to receive the entire excess remaining after the class "A" debentures and
the common stock have been paid in full. The common stock in this
company is thus preferred, while the "B" income debentures are really
common stock.
These misnamed securities were issued long before railroad regulatory commissions possessed any real authority. It is doubtful whether
they could be issued in substantial amounts at the present time in the
railroad, or public utility, or even perhaps in the industrial, fields. For
in addition to the Interstate Commerce Commission and the various
state utility boards we now have a new Schoolmaster in finance, the
Securities and Exchange Commission. This young Schoolmaster has
shown an aggressive attitude and has not hesitated to rap the knuckles
of any of the ''boys" who are guilty of careless terminology. No company having a real contact with the Securities and Exchange Commission would emerge with a security misnomer like that of the Green
Bay & Western.1

*

The purpose of this article is to present the attitude and views of the Securities
and Exchange Commission on various financial problems. Several phases of the commission's thinking are in the writer's opinion extreme and questionable, or even unsound. Its actions have not always been consistent with its official views. Since the
writer's purpose, however, has been merely to describe and not to criticize, no attempt
has been made to appraise the work of the commission.
Professor of Economics, and head of Department of Economics, De Pauw University. B.A., St. Olaf College; M.A., Ph.D., University of Wisconsin. Author, Economics of the Radio Industry (1925) and of various articles in periodicals.-Ed.
1 By chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act as revised and amended in 1938 (Chandler
Act), 52 Stat. L. 840 at 890, II U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 572, the S. E. C. is given

t
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THE S.E.C. AND ACCURATE TERMINOLOGY
In the reorganization of the larger industrial and public utility and
financial companies the S.E.C. is required under chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act 2 to render to the bankruptcy court an advisory report on the
fairf!esS and equitableness and the feasibility of the reorganization plan,
while in the case of the smaller companies the S.E.C. submits such
report only if the court requests. To be feasible,3 according to S.E.C.
standards, a plan of reorganization must provide a workable capital
structure. That is, the probable future earnings must be several times
the amount of interest or preferred dividends, the nature of the securities must fit the business and income of the company, and the reorganized corporation must have reasonable assurance of adequate fixed
and working capital. Since the stocks and bonds issued in a reorganization are exempt from the Securities Act of 1933, the S.E.C. has also
insisted under the requirement of feasibility that these securities be
(among others) the duty to render advisory opinions to the courts as to the fairness
or equitableness and feasibility of a plan of reorganization of any company subject to
bankruptcy proceedings under the act. The duty to function in such advisory capacity
was also imposed by the old section 77B, enacted in 1934, amended in 1935, and later
merged into and superseded by the Chandler Act. By the Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935, 49 Stat. L. 838, 15 U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 79 et seq., the
S. E. C. is given ( among others) the power and duty to approve or disapprove the
issuance of securities by registered holding companies and their subsidiaries; to examine
such companies with a view to possible simplification of their corporate structures, the
elimination of unnecessary complexities, and the fair distribution of voting powers;
to take appropriate steps to protect the financial integrity of companies in holding
company systems; and with some exceptions to require any unduly pyramided holding
system to make the adjustments necessary to integrate it geographically and economically, with only one intermediate company allowed between the top holding company
and the operating subsidiaries. By the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 53 Stat. L. I 149,
15 U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 77 aaa et seq., corporations must file their trust indentures
as part of their registration statements with the Securities and Exchange Commission,
These indentures must contain certain statements in regard to the work and liability
of the corporate trustee. Only slight attention will be given in this article to the work
of the S. E. C. under the Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. L. 74, 15 U. S. C. (1934),
§ 77a et seq., the main emphasis of which is upon requiring issuing corporations to
give accurate and complete information rather than upon any positive control by the
S. E. C. Occasional reference will be made to the enforcement by the S. E. C. of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. L. 881, 15 U.S. C. (1934), § 78a et seq.,
which also amended the Securities Act of 1933, and of the Investment Company Act
of 1940, 54 Stat. L. 789, 15 U. S. C. A. (1941), § 8oa-1 et seq. The functions
of the S. E. C. under the old 77 B were, and under chapter X are, advisory to the bankruptcy courts, while the S. E. C. is in direct charge of the administration of the other
acts mentioned.
2
52 Stat. L. 840 at 890 (1938), 11 U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 572.
3 As to the requirements which a plan must meet to be fair and equitable, see infra,
pages 629 to 635.
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accurately named and described, so as not to deceive possible future
investors. Under the Public Utility Holding Company Act,4 the
S.E.C. has set up even more stringent standards for registered electric
and gas companies desiring to issue securities. The S.E.C. has been
extremely impatient of inaccurate and misleading terminology.
The reorganization plan of Flour Mills of America provided for
the issuance of "Convertible Term Notes," which were to be "subordinated to all creditors, present and future." They were to bear contingent interest which was not to be paid during the first two years even
though earned. The S.E.C. sternly charged that they were not really
promises to pay, that the name was deceiving. 5
The reorganization plan of Griess-Pfleger Tanning Company contained a proposal that "capital income debentures" be issued. These
were to have no lien, were to pay interest only if earned, and were to be
junior to all creditors, present and future. The S. E. C. stated that
these securities were really preferred stock which should be frankly so
labelled. The use of such a deceptive name was not to be tolerated. 6
The reorganized Reynolds Investing Company was to be slowly
liquidated; hence the proposed preferred stock was to be entitled to no
regular dividends. Moreover, the voting rights of both preferred and
common stock were limited. The S. E. C. suggested that the names
"class A and class B liquidation certificates," instead of preferred and
common stock, would be clearer and would help to prevent mistake
by future purchasers of the securities.7
Sham and subterfuge cropping out in other forms has also been the
subject of S. E. C. disapproval. Arguing that the bargaining involved
in the issuance of securities through direct arrangements with an investment house was only a mockery, the S. E. C. directed that power
and light securities be issued through a process of competitive bidding.8
~Especially under section 7(d), 49 Stat. L. 815 (1935), 15 U.S. C. (Supp.
1939), § 79g(d).
5
In the Matter of Flour Mills of America, Corp. Reorg. Release No. 22, April
11, 1940.
6
In the Matter of Griess-Pfleger Tanning Co., Corp. Reorg. Release No. 13,
June 16, 1939.
7
ln the Matter of Reynolds Investing Co., Corp. Reorg. Release No. 19, February 6, 1940.
8
An indirect influence of the S. E. C. requirement may be seen in the announcement on August 30, 1941, that the American Telephone & Telegraph Company was
adopting competitive bidding for the marketing of a proposed $95,000,000 bond issue,
thus breaking a 3 5-year-old banker relationship with the House of Morgan. The
action of American Telephone & Telegraph was voluntary, since the Federal Communications Commission had not required competitive bidding. INDIANAPOLIS STAR,
August 31, 1941. See also N. Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1941, § 3, p. 4:1. The issue was
sold to a group of insurance companies.
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It has scrutinized dividend policies and bookkeeping entries, and many
times the Schoolmaster has brought out the hickory rod.
A distilling company declared a dividend in whiskey, the cost value
of which was $73,760.48. Since there were only six stockholders to
receive this liquid treasure, the plan required them to transfer it back
to the company, but at the market value, namely, $rn5,28r.9r. For
this, the stockholders were to receive 45,000 shares of common stock
with a total par value of $22,500. Thus, the net effect of the transaction was an increase of surplus by $9,02r.43. This procedure was
mere pretext, said the S. E. C. The payment of the dividend and the
subsequent sale of the stock were really only one transaction intended
to accomplish a writing up of the assets.9
The Tucson Gas, Electric Light and Power Company reduced its
depreciation reserve account by $r,524,ooo, crediting this amount to
earned surplus. Calling attention to the fact that it had in many previous decisions expressed disapproval of such sophistry in accounting,
the S. E. C. "impounded" this surplus by forbidding the payment of
dividends on the common stock as long as the company's first mortgage
bonds should be outstanding unless the surplus always equalled at least
the amount by which it had been arbitrarily increased.10
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF

s. E. C.

In its seven years of existence the S. E. C. has had a shifting membership, being presided over today by its sixth chairman.11 Nevertheless,
it has already built up a vast and coherent body of fundamental principles. True to the nature of the pedagogue, the commission in its decisions and reports has frequently repeated and stressed the main
articles in its creed. The fundamental principles may be summarized
under the following heads:
r. Adherence to the absolute priority rule in reorganization plans.
2. Requirement of certain financial standards.
3. Insistence upon the interpretation of the various acts in such a
way as to bring about a uniformity and unity of action.
9

"Accounting and the S. E. C.," 12 AccoUNTING REv. 309 at 312 (1937).
In the Matter of Federal Light & Traction Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 2800, June 5, 1941. The S. E. C. brushed aside the fact that the Arizona
Corporation Commission had approved the transfer from reserve to surplus.
11
The chairmen have been Joseph P. Kennedy, James M. Landis, William 0.
Douglas, Jerome Frank, and Edward C. Eicher. The present chairman is Ganson
Purcell. One resigned to become an ambassador, one the dean of a law school, two to
become federal judges, and one a justice of the United States Supreme Court. The
filling of the vacancies recently created will constitute the fifteenth and sixteenth appointments to the commission.
10
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Absolute Priority Rule in Reorganization
To receive the approval of the Securities and Exchange Commission
or of the federal courts either under the old 77B or under chapter X
of the revised and amended Bankruptcy Act, a reorganization plan must
be fair and equitable to all concerned, as well as feasible.12 Any reorganization plan of a public utility company for the purpose of simplification under the Holding Company Act must meet substantially the
same requirements.
To be fair and equitable, the plan of reorganization must follow the
absolute priority rule.18 According to this doctrine, whether a company
is solvent or insolvent, the prior claimants must be paid in full, either
in new securities or in property or in valuable privileges, before anything can be given to subsequent security holders.
If, for instance, the assets of a corporation in the process of reorganization are worth $ I ,000,000 while the outstanding bonds are $ I ,200,000 and accrued interest $ rno,ooo and the cumulative preferred stock
is $400,000 and unpaid dividends $rno,ooo, the company is insolvent
in the bankruptcy sense. (That is, liabilities exceed the liquidating value
of the assets.) In the reorganization plan it would be unfair and inequitable to give any participation to the common or preferred stock. All
the new securities should go to the bondholders. These new securities
might be bonds and stocks, or in the interest of simplification the old
bondholders might be given only common stock. But under no circumstances are the old preferred and common stockholders, who have
no equity, to receive any share in the new company unless they contribute new assets or "money's worth."
If, now, the bonds were $500,000 and the preferred stock $400,000,
with unpaid dividends and interest at the same figures as before the company would not be insolvent in the bankruptcy sense, but it would still
be unfair and inequitable, in case of reorganization, to give any of the
new securities to the common stockholders. The new securities should
go first to the bondholders and after they are compensated in full for
their principal and interest the balance would be given to the old preferred holders. If, again with a view toward simplification or in the in12

The meaning of "feasibility'' was discussed on pages 626 and 627.
The court cases upholding the absolute priority rule, in preference to the relative priority rule, are legion. Three leading cases of the United States Supreme Court
are: Northern Pacific R. R. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 33 S. Ct. 554 (1913); Case v.
Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U.S. 106, 60 S. Ct. I (1939); Consolidated
Rock Products Co. v. DuBois, 312 U.S. 510, 61 S. Ct. 675 (1941). The two last
mentioned cases involved reorganizations under section 77B. The Boyd case arose out
of the early Northern Pacific bondholders' foreclosure and reorganization.
18
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terest of feasibility, the plan provides for the issuance of only common
stock, the bondholders would get the full value of their claim in common stock, before anything is given to the old preferred holders. The
old common stockholders would have no equity and therefore could
have no participation, not even stock purchase warrants, in the new company unless they pay for it with cash or other "balance sheet assets."
If, on the other hand, the reasonable value of the assets is $2,500,000, the common stock would in both situations have an equity and
would be allowed to participate in the reorganized company.
As already suggested, unless a group of security holders have a
valuable equity in the reorganized company, the S. E. C. has refused
to approve giving them even a contingent right to participate. At
times the writers of the plan of reorganization have provided for the
issuance of stock purchase warrants or rights to old security holders
possessing no equity, on the theory that, should the company begin earning money in the future, it would be only decent to give these securities
a chance to participate in these prospects even if only to a slight extent.
But the S. E. C. has generally frowned upon such attempts, stating that
if the old security, say the common stock, has no equity at the time of
the reorganization, the granting to it of even the faintest opportunity to
share in the future profits, without requiring a full payment therefor,
would thin out to that extent the value of the new common stock.
The value of the property of Griess-Pfleger Tanning Company was
fixed by the commission at $r,675,ooo. The amount owed to the first
mortgage bondholders was $1,653,000, leaving only $22,000 for the
stockholders. The par value of, and the accrued dividends on, the preferred stock totalled $r,500,ooo, thus leaving nothing for the common
stock. The reorganization plan proposed to give the old common stockholders 8.4 % and the old preferred holders 73 % of the common stock
of the new corporation. The bondholders were to receive new "capital
income debentures," carrying a greatly reduced interest rate, an extended maturity date, and, of course, no lien. No credit was given them
for back interest, the par of the new "capital income debentures" being
equal to the par of the old bonds. For these sacrifices the old bondholders were to be given, in addition to the new "capital income debentures," a small amount of the new common stock and a right to a
share in the management of the company. The new "capital income
debentures" were to have the convertible feature. The draftsmen of
the reorganization plan hoped that these special concessions to the bondholders would help to satisfy the "full value" requirement of the absolute priority rule.

1942

J

THE NEW SCHOOLMASTER

The S. E. C. refused to approve this plan. It stated that the extra
privileges given to the bondholders were practically worthless,1 4 that
they were attempts to create value out of thin air. The absolute priority
principle, said the S. E. C., demands under the circumstances that the
old preferred stock be assigned only a very small amount of participation in the new company and that the old common stock be completely
excluded.15 This case represents a typical point of view of the commission.16
If the Griess-Pfleger assets had been worth, say, $4,000,000, the
old common stock would have had a right to participate in the reorganization. The convertible privilege and a share in the management would
then also have been worth something to the new bondholders. The enforcement of the absolute priority rule has thus focused attention on
the problem of evaluation of assets. Perhaps the greatest opportunity
14
The matter can also be put this way: feasibility would seem to require that there
be only common stock outstanding. Since there are barely enough assets to meet the
debts, the absolute priority rule will dictate that almost all the new common stock be
allocated to the old bondholders, only a small share to go to the old preferred stock.
Thus, the old bondholders would have almost complete ownership and control of the
new company. To allow them a share in the management and a chance by the conversion feature to increase their ownership rights is giving them something they already
have. Hence, these "concessions" are practically worthless.
15
In the Matter of Griess-Pfleger Tanning Co., Corp. Reorg. Release No. 13,
June 16, 1939.
16
The commission has, however, beclouded its stand on the absolute priority rule.
A plan of reorganization or merger drawn up under section 1 1 ( e) of the Holding
Company Act gave the holders of the class A stock of the Federal Water Service Corporation, one of the companies concerned, a portion of the new common stock in
exchange for their old stock, in spite of the fact that the class A stock was admitted to
possess no book value. Rather, there was a capital deficit which would be wiped out by
the rearrangement. The S. E. C. in a divided opinion held that the words "fair and
equitable" as used in section I I ( e) permitted the operation of the relative priority
principle, particularly since no question of liquidation was involved. Accordingly, the
commission sanctioned the allocation of new stock to the class A stock. In the Matter
of Federal Water Service Corp., Holding Company Act Release No. 2635, March 24,
1941.
This decision has been severely criticized. The words "fair and equitable," whether
used in the bankruptcy laws or in section I le of the Holding Company Act, or
whether used in connection with an insolvent or a solvent corporation, have "attained
a fixed and definite meaning in the field of judicial interpretation." Priority rights
"should not be made to depend on such extraneous facts as the presence or absence
of imminent liquidation." Moreover, unfair and inequitable distribution of voting
power among the securities would bring the company also under section n(b)(2) of
the act. See comment in 40 M1cH. L. REv. 91 at 96, 97 (1941). Courts have frequently referred to fair and equitable as "words of art."
For some exceptions to the absolute priority rule made by the S. E. C. even in
reorganizations under the bankruptcy laws see infra, pages 645-646.
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of the Schoolmaster to "expound'~ has come in this important question
of value.
In true Justice Holmes fashion 17 the S. E. C. recognizes that the
term value may have several meanings. There is valuation for taxation
and for condemnation, for balance sheet construction and computation
of depreciation, for utility rate-making and for bargaining, for the upset
price in liquidation and for a going value in reorganization. The point
of view may differ _greatly. In rate-making, for instance, "the question
is how much the utility will be allowed to earn if it can." In reorganization, on the other hand, "the question is how much can it earn, even
if allowed." 18
For plant valuation purposes in reorganization or simplification,
the S. E. C. has adopted the familiar principle of capitalization of
probable future earnings. Since the company is to continue in operation,
this method is more logical than the setting of a liquidation value.
Value is the result of two factors: the average annual net earnings ( after
depreciation but before federal income taxes) which the company may
reasonably expect in the future, and the rate of capitalization.
The determination of a reasonable future rate of earnings has often
caused a clash between the commission and the company representatives
or reorganization trustees and security holders committees. Trustees
and reorganization committees, for instance, may wish to show an equity
for a security when there is none, or a utility may wish to issue bonds
when the earnings situation does not justify such a step. Time and again,
the Schoolmaster has had to call attention to the distinction between
reasonably possible earnings and hoped for earnings. It has also inspected income statements, especially to determine whether proper
depreciation in the past has been allowed. In the reliance upon earnings
as a method of determining capital value, it is especially desirable that
proper deductions for depreciation be made so as to keep the plant in
an even state of operating efficiency. Original cost and cost of reproduction do not directly affect value, but they have evidential significance
in estimating earnings. A record of typical past income, moderated by
future currents of uncertainty, furnishes the best test of potential
earrungs.
The rate of capitalization depends upon the nature and position of
17 The commission loves to quote Justices Brandeis and Holmes in regard to the
nature of value. One of its favorite quotations is from Mr. Holmes: "A word is not a
crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary
greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is
used." Towne v. Eisner, 245 U. S. 418 at 425, 38 S. Ct. 158 (1918).
18 Matter of Genesee Valley Gas Co., 3 S. E. C. 104 at 112, note 19 (1938).
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the industry, the history and standing of the company, the record of
other establishments in the same field, the regularity of earnings, possible future trends, both in the company and in the industry, money
rates, and innumerable possible political, economic, business, and scientific developments. In short, the rate of capitalization depends mainly
on the amount of risk.
The rates allowed or recommended by the S. E. C. vary from about
4½% ors% 19 to 8% for companies with reasonably good prospects
to more than 12% for "sick babies." For utilities the rates have run
from 4½ or 5% to 7%, while for industrials the most frequent figutes
come within the range 8 to 10%, three reorganized companies being
allowed I2 % or above.20
The S.E.C. thus appears to be rather liberal 21 in its fixing or suggesting of rates of capitalization. Professor Dewing points out 22 that
in the boom year 1929 an electric utility stock involving little risk
would sell on a 6 or 7 up to 10% level on the basis of earnings before
depreciation and a railroad stock would similarly sell at 8 or 8½%,
while a large industrial corporation stock with only a moderate amount
of risk would be worth about five times its earnings. Pure interest rates
are lower at the present time than in 1929 and thus more liberal capitalization rates than those suggested by Dewing are permitted, but it
seems difficult to justify the 4½ or 5% rate for Utilities Power &
Light or the 9.8% rate for the Higbee Company 28 or even the 8.7%
rate for the drug department of McKesson & Robbins,2' to say nothing
19
In some instances it is difficult to know exactly what rate the commission
recommends. This is especially true in Matter of Utilities Power & Light Corp., 5
S. E. C. 483 (1939). The writer of a note in 55 HARV. L. REV. 125 at 133 (1941),
computes the allowed rate as 4¼ to 5%.
20
In the Flour Mills of America case the S. E. C. concluded that, considering the
risk, any rate lower than 12% would not be proper. In fact, "a rate substantially
higher than 1 2 per cent would appear appropriate." In the Matter of Flour Mills of
America, Corp. Reorg. Release No. 22, April I 1, 1940, p. 19, note 57. For the
Atlas Pipeline Corporation the S. E. C. said that "a proper rate of return to be applied
to the debtor's earnings before income taxes would be I 5%, certainly not less than
12o/o." In the Matter of Atlas Pipeline Corp., Corp. Reorg. Release No. 42, June 7,
1941, p. 24. For the Sayre & Fisher Brick Company the rate was set at 12%. In the
Matter of Sayre & Fisher Brick Co., Corp. Reorg. Release No. 47, September 12,
1941.
21
By "liberal" is,meant the allowing of a low percentage rate, with a consequent
high multiplier. By "conservative," on the other hand, is meant the setting of a high
percentage rate, with a consequent low multiplier.
22
DEWING, CORPORATION FINANCE 53-54 (1931).
28
In the Matter of Higbee Co., Corp. Reorg. Release No. 39, March 25, 1941.
2
' In the Matter of McKesson & Robbins, Corp. Reorg. Release No. 41, March
29, 1941.
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about the 8½ to 9½% discount rate for Penn Timber Company.25
Even at the present time the common stock of many financially sound
companies with excellent income and dividend records are selling at
only ten or twelve times annual earnings.
The federal courts tend to be even more liberal, for in several instances they have raised the valuation recommended by the S. E. C.26
Courts appear frequently to take the point of view of not disillusioning
past investors,21 while the function of the S. E. C. seems to be rather
to protect future investors. It is logical, then, that the S. E. C. be more
conservative in its appraisals than the courts.
The figure obtained by dividing the average probable future earnings by the interest rate gives the present value of the future earnings,
assuming permanent operation. This becomes the value of the plant,
including necessary working capital, as a going concern. To this result
may be added the market value of certain unessential current assets and
the possible market value of fixed assets not used in the operation of
the business.· Where the operating life is limited, for instance, by
franchise as in the case of a bridge company, by known inherent weaknesses of the corporation, or by special circumstances, it is necessary,
however, to calculate the present values of the cash profits that the
company will receive during its remaining life. To this total must be
25
In the Matter of Penn Timber Co., Corp. Reorg. Release No. 46, September
2, 1941. Since the company is to be liquidated, the percentages given are really discount rates rather than capitalization rates.
26
See note in 55 HARV. L. REV. 125 at 134 (1941), stating that in the Flour
Mills of America case, Corp. Reorg. Release No. 22, April II, 1940, "the 12% recommended by the Commission was rejected [by the court] in favor of the trustee's capitalization .•. at 8%." In the 77B proceedings involving the William Penn Hotel belonging to the Pittsburgh Hotels Corporation, . the facts showed that the hotel had
rented a daily average of 31.7% of its rooms. The district judge accepted the potential income figures as given by an appraisal company on the basis of 45 % of the
rooms being rented in the future and capitalized the net earnings resulting from these
calculations at a 6% rate. In re Pittsburgh Hotels Corp., (D. C. Pa. 1936) 17 F.
Supp. 949.
27 In the railroad reorganization cases both the Interstate Commerce Commission
and the federal courts seem to be influenced by the amount of the investment in the
railroad company rather than by any reasonable capitalization of probable earnings.
This accounts for the fact that in none of the important railroad reorganizations now
pending or recently approved will the rate of return on the new capitalization on the
basis of 1926 to 1939 earnings exceed 5%.
Federal District Judge Barnes, in passing on the Chicago & Northwestern reorganization, said: "The court finds that the [Interstate Commerce] Commission's
estimate of probable earnings in a normal future year is sufficiently opthnistic. • • ."
In re Chicago & N. W. Ry., (D. C. Ill. 1940) 35 F. Supp. 230 at 253. Italics the
writer's.
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added the present worth of the probable price realizable at the end
of the corporation's life from the disposal or scrapping of its assets. 28
Adherence to Financial Standards
The laws giving great powers to the S. E. C. also set down certain
general rules for its guidance, but they allow the commission a wide
scope of action. The S. E. C. has used its discretionary powers in insisting upon or recommending certain financial standards. A few of
these will be summarized.
I. Bonds should have adequate asset coverage. The S. E. C. has
set for electric and gas companies a fifty per cent ratio of bonds to net
plant 29 as the highest generally advisable proportion. It is possible
that the desirable ratio will fall greatly below fifty per cent if the
financing of operating companies by the sale of common stock to the
public becomes more popular.
The S. E. C. permitted the New York State Electric & Gas Corporation to carry on certain financing and construction even though the ratio
of "debt to net plant" after the financing would be fifty-six per cent,
because there were certain alleviating circumstances which would improve the situation. Among these were the State Utility Commission
requirement that $1,380,000 of the earnings each year be used for new
construction and for the acquisition and redemption of outstanding
bonds. The president of the company also·promised that the company
would not pay dividends in excess of$ I ,500,000 during I 941 .30 Several
times the S. E. C. has ordered the cessation of the payment of common
stock dividends to a parent company until the ratio of bonds to net plant
had been improved.
Generally the S. E. C., in attempting to enforce this standard, has
waited for companies to apply for permission to issue new securities,
whereupon it could act under section 7(d) of the Holding Company
28
This problem is well discussed by the S. E. C. in Matter of Atlas Pipeline Corp.,
Corp. Reorg. Release No. 42, June 7, 1941. The commission estimated the operating
life of the company at about five years.
·
29
Sometimes the term "ratio of debt to total capitalization" is also used. While
the two expressions are not synonymous, both represent the same fundamental idea,
namely adequate backing for bonds. A desirable ratio of debt to total capitalization for
public utilities appears to be about 40 to 45 o/o. In England the average ratio of debt to
total capitalization for 34 of the larger electric utilities is only 29%. See In the
Matter of El Paso Electric Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 2535, February
4, 1941.
30
In the Matter of New York State Electric & Gas Corp., Holding Company Act
Release No. 2807, June 9, 1941. Incidentally, this was the first issue of public utility
securities to come before the S. E. C. under the requirement of competitive bidding.
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Act. Recently, however, the S. E. C. began analyzing the financial
structure of all registered holding companies and their operating subsidiaries with the purpose of determining whether such capital structures
show the proper balance between bonds and stocks. Under section r2(c)
the S. E. C. can apparently, through control over dividends, take the
initiative in protecting "the financial integrity of companies in holding
company systems" without having to pass upon a previous application
by the companies.
2. Bond interest and preferred dividend requirements should be
adequately covered. In the old equity receivership and reorganization
process common before r934 the intention was frankly not to reduce the
par value of the securities. The main adjustment took place in the
changing of fixed income securities into income bonds and preferred
stock. If the income in the poorest contemplated year promised to equal
the charges on the fixed interest bonds, the reorganization was considered a success. If the company continued unable to pay interest, it would
be forced through another reorganization.
Under the old system the courts hesitated to scrutinize the feasibility of plans, being generally satisfied if the security holders freely
approved the plan of reorganization. A few instances can be found
where federal district judges undertook to write a substitute plan when
they were not satisfied with the fairness and practicability of the plan
as presented by the reorganization committees and managers. But since
the federal courts had no research staffs and very few facilities for independent investigation, this was seldom done. Moreover, the federal
law laid down no positive standards for a plan of reorganization. Under
the rules of court procedure, the typical judge felt that even though
something was wrong, in his opinion, with the plan, if no one made a
point of this in the hearings, it was not up to the court to interfere, any
more than it would halt the enforcement of an ordinary contract, provided the actions of the parties were free of the taint of fraud and
coercron.
The bankruptcy laws passed since r933-34have provided for standards which reorganization plans must meet. They must be fair and
equitable and feasible. 81 To aid the courts in determining whether
81 Generally no reference, unless otherwise indicated, is made in this article to
section 77, applying to interstate railroad reorganizations, which was in 1933 added
to the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and later amended in 1935. 47 Stat. L. 1474, 49 Stat.
L. 9n, II U. S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 205. Under section 77 any plan of reorganization must be fair and equitable. If the Interstate Commerce Commission approves a
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plans met these requirements, Congress charged the S. E. C. with the
duty of acting as their adviser. The federal judges have made wide use
of the facilities of the S. E. C.32 even in the smaller reorganizations
where they are not required to do so. The federal courts now feel
bound to pass upon the justice and soundness of a plan even though
no opposition is expressed.88 The security holders, in fact, under chapter X do not vote on the plan until it has been approved by the court.
Since stocks and bonds issued in a reorganization are exempt from the
provisions of the Securities Act, the courts feel they have an additional
obligation to pass with care upon the merits of a reorganization plan.
Under the current procedure of reorganization, the S. E. C. hesitates to recommend a plan in which the interest will not be earned at
least two or three times. For instance, in Matter of Utilities Power &
Light Corporation the interest requirements were $575,000 and the
net income about$ r ,6~ 5,000. This was pretty fair, said the Schoolmaster.
But he was not impressed by the overall coverage on the bond interest
and preferred dividends of r.54 times. Moreover, the promised earnings of 17 cents per share on the common stock did not appear so rosy.
Even in the case of solvent companies applying under the Holding
Company Act for permission to issue securities, the S. E. C. is required
to consider the coverage of interest and dividends. For instance, when
84,

plan, it is certified to the federal court, which holds hearings and also passes on its
fairness and equitableness and conformity to law. The I. C. C. serves in an advisory
capacity to the court. The word "feasible" is not used in section 77, but the law specifically mentions certain specifications, for instance, "adequate coverage of fixed
charges" {paragraph b), which are usually included within the term "feasible." Federal
courts in passing on the plans frequently discuss their "soundness."
82
ln September, 1938, the S. E. C. announced that it had accepted the invitation
of Judge Lederle, of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, to become a party to the reorganization proceedings involving the Detroit International Bridge Company. This was the first reorganization proceeding in which the
S. E. C. participated under the Chandler Act and in which it became a party. Corp.
Reorg. Release No. 2, September 26, 1938. In about half the cases to which the S.E.C.
becomes a party under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act as amended, it has entered the
proceedings upon the request of the judge while in the other half the Commission
"became a party upon the judge's approval of its motion to file a notice of appearance,"
Corp. Reorg. Release No. 44, June 25, 1941.
88
See, for instance, In re American Dept. Stores Corp., (D. C. Del. 1936) 16 F.
Supp. 977 at 979-980, in which the district judge in a 77B proceeding said: "Although the plan were unopposed, the court should not approve any feature fundamentally unsound. [The exemption of securities issued pursuant to a plan of reorganization confirmed by the federal court from the provisions of the Securities Act] imposes
upon the courts the task of scrutinizing with care securities to be issued under a plan
of reorganization."
u 5 s. E. C. 483 (1939).
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the Ohio Power Company wanted to refund its preferred stock, the
S. E. C. said: 35
cc ••• Giving effect to the proposed transactions ... interest would
be earned on all the first mortgage bonds to be outstanding 4.4
times and the coverages on total long-term debt to be outstanding
would be 3.8 times [on the basis of earnings for 1940]. Total
income deductions and preferred dividend requirements would
be covered 2. 7 times."
In spite of this rather favorable outlook, the S. E. C. imposed
cc ••• a condition to the effect that no common stock dividends shall
be paid ( other than dividends payable in stock), nor other distribution made on the common stock, unless there is retained in
earned surplus surplus at least $6,700,000 plus an accumulated
amount equal to $ I ,ooo~ooo a year for eight calendar years. This
condition will result in maintaining the same policy in this regard
that the company has followed during the last three years. . . ."
3. The common stock should have a satisfactory cushion. The
S. E. C. follows the best academic opinion in the belief that a cushion
for the common stock is important, even for the protection of the senior
securities. This is in almost violent contrast with former stock promotions and reorganizations in which the common stock was frequently
admitted to be worthless.
4. The protective provisions for limited return stock should be adequate and really effective. Following the lead of commissioners who
were at first in the minority,36 the S. E. C. has recognized that the usual
protective devices for preferred stock are often mere fair weather expedients and has frequently taken steps to make them effective or has
compelled the use of more stringent requirements. The S. E. C. has
85

In the Matter of The Ohio Power Co., Holding Company Act Release No.
2660, March 29, 1941, p. 4·
86
The S. E. C. approved a new preferred stock issue of the North American Company with comparatively few restrictions, on the theory that since there was already
a substantial cushion built up by the omission of cash dividends on the common stock
little further protection was needed. Moreover, the 58,800 common stockholders were
widely scattered, no single holder, apparently, owning as much as 1oo/o of the stock,
and therefore there could not be concerted action by them. Commissioner Frank
dissented sharply from the majority opinion, arguing that the adequacy of safeguards for
preferred stocks depends not on the situation when they are issued, but on what may
happen if the company suffers reverses. Preferred stockholders give up certain privileges,
in exchange for which limitation they should' have greater security than ordinary stock.
This security must be effective during adversity. In the Matter of North American
Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 1427, January 30, 1939.
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not, however, prescribed any specific minimum standards applicable to
all situations. It has attempted to consider the special circumstances of
each case.87
5. Voting rights, to be effective, must be fairly distributed among
the various types of securities. The new preferred stock of the Ohio
Power Company 88 was given regularly one vote per share. The common stock influence was reduced to one-tenth of a vote per share. Thus,
the preferred stockholders have about thirty per cent of the total voting
power. This decision was made under the Public Utility Holding Company Act. Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act also set up standards for
the distribution of voting power in reorganized companies, stipulating
that the judge in approving a plan of reorganization must be satisfied
that the control of the corporation is compatible with the interests of the
various groups of security holders. Nonvoting stock is not favored.
It is, of course, in the proceedings involving simplification of holding company systems that the problem of fair distribution of voting
power is especially acute. The recent decision ordering the termination
and dissolution of National Power & Light Company, one of the five
subholding company subsidiaries of Electric Bond & Share Company,
brought out the fact that the securities owned by National Power &
Light represent only 23,½ % of the total capital contributed by all the
security holders in its system. Moreover, Electric Bond & Share has
"unassailable control" of National Power & Light through ownership
of 46.56% of the latter's common stock, "which securities represent an
interest of only 6.65% in the total capitalization of National's subsidiaries." These figures assume the validity of the capitalization figures
as given by the holding company and its subsidiaries. If proper adjustment is made for the large amount of write-ups, the S. E. C. tentatively
concludes that the "securities owned by Bond and Share represent an
87
Special restrictions imposed by the S. E. C. have often taken the form of making
surplus unavailable for common stock dividends until it is above a specified point, forbidding common stock dividends, or limiting salaries, or giving the preferred a right
to elect the majority or a specified percentage of the board of directors until certain
indebtedness has been discharged. The S. E. C. has frequently disregarded the fact
that the preferred stockholders have approved the issue of new indebtedness ahead of
them. The preferred stockholders may not appreciate the significance of their action,
and the S. E. C. feels that it must protect future as well as present preferred holders.
See, for instance, In the Matter of Northeastern Water & Electric Corp., Holding
Company Act Release No. 2314, October 2, 1940, and In the Matter of Higbee Co.,
Corp. Reorg. Release No. 39, March 25, 1941. Certain changes in the Higbee plan
made for the protection of preferred holders are described in Release No. 40.
88
In the Matter of Ohio Power Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 2660,
March 29, 1941.
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interest of only r.27 per cent in the capitalization of the National Subsidiaries." 39
•
6. The capital structure of a corporation should be simple. The
S. E. C. has been emphatic on this point, both in its administration of
the Holding Company Act and in its advisory capacity under the reorganization statutes. For a time it was feared that under the rigid
judicial interpretation of the absolute priority rule such simplification
would be extremely difficult or even impossible. In the Consolidated
Rock Products case, however, the Supreme Court, speaking through
Justice Douglas, a former member of the S. E. C., said: 40
"The absolute priority rule does not mean that bondholders
cannot be given inferior grades of securities, or even securities of
the same grade as are received by junior interests. Requirements
of feasibility of reorganization plans frequently necessitate it in the
:interests of simpler and more conservative capital structures. And
standards of fairness permit it. . .. while creditors may be given
inferior grades of securities, their 'superior rights' must be recognized. Clearly, those prior rights are not recognized, in cases
where stockholders are participating in the plan, if creditors are
given only a face amount of inferior securities equal to the face
:amount of their claims. They must receive, in addition, compensation for the senior rights which they are to surrender. If they re,ceive less than that full compensatory treatment, some of their
property rights will be appropriated for the benefit of stockholders
without compensation. That is not permissible. The plan then
-comes within judicial denunciation...•
"Practical adjustments, rather than a rigid formula, are necessary. The method of effecting full compensation for senior claimants will vary from case to case. . . . But whether in case of a
·solvent company the creditors should be made whole for the
change in or loss of their _seniority by an increased participation in
assets, in earnings or in control, or in any combination thereof, will
be dependent on the facts and requirements in each case. So long
:as the new securities offered are of a value equal to the creditors'
daims, the appropriateness of the formula employed rests in the
informed discretion of the court." 41
39

In the Matter of Electric Bond & Share Co., Holding Company Act Release
No. 2962, August 23, 1941, pp. 34, 35·
4
Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. DuBois, 312 U. S. 510 at 528-530, 61
S. Ct. 675 (1941).
41 This case was under section 77 B. But the requirement is the same under
chapter X and presumably under the Holding Company Act, as well as under section
77 for railroads. The absolute priority rule is a long-standing principle, in nominal
effect without any statute, at least from the Boyd case (1913). Some doubt has been
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7. Investors must interest themselves in details of operation as well
as purely financial figures. The typical investor is likely to seek information in terms of book values, times interest earned, or earnings per
share. While these are important, the S. E. C. has also focused attention on the facts back of these financial ratios: the data on actual operations. Many of the reports on reorganization and simplification plans
contain analyses of income and costs, with frank statements as to the
points of strength and weakness. The S. E. C. has frequently exercised
pressure to change certain operating polici~. These advisory reports,
with other statements from various parties, are circulated among the
various security holders as a form of information preliminary to their
vote on the reorganization plan. They are likely to influence not only
their attitude as to the plan, but also their interest in and watchfulness
of future corporate activities.
Insistence upon Unity in Legislative Policy
The S. E. C. is directly responsible for the administration of a half
dozen laws, three of which, the Securities Act, the Securities Exchange
Act, and the Public Utility Holding Company Act, are of major scope
and significance. It is also charged with the duty of acting in an advisory capacity to the federal courts in reorganization under our general
bankruptcy law. A company may thus be involved in proceedings under
several laws af the same time, or action under one may exempt it from
the provisions of another. Or a corporation may be in litigation under a
statute giving the S. E. C. only advisory authority while it may also
have applied to it a law which the S. E. C. directly administers. Such
situations give rise to possibilities for inconsistency and even conflict
of authority. Sometimes the even-tempered Schoolmaster has bristled
with "departmental jealousy."
Stocks and bonds resulting from a reorganization are exempt from
the registration required by the Securities.Act.42 If the S. E. C. functions in an advisory capacity to the court, it can study the feasibility and
fairness of the plan and thus be on the lookout for unsound features,
bad terminology, and misrepresentation and deceit. But in the smaller
cases, the court may or may not, as it sees fit, refer plans to the S. E. C.
If not so referred, securities may slip into the market which have not
been registered under the Securities Act and have not been inspected
thrown by the S. E. C. upon the applicability of the absolute priority rule under section
n(e) of the Holding Company Act where no dissolution of the company is imolved.
See note I 6, supra.
42 The indentures of bonds issued in reorganization must meet the requirements
of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939.
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bythe S. E. C. While most federal bankruptcy judges have recognized
their added obligations under the present reorganization laws to study
the plans from the point of view of their feasibility, as well as fairness,
the S. E. C. does not hesitate to call this duty to the attention of the
courts.
If a utility subject to the Holding Company Act is to go through
the reorganization process under the Bankruptcy Act, such as happened
to Utilities Power & Light, the S. E. C. vigorously insists that the
standards of both acts be upheld. "It would be unfair," said Chairman
Douglas, "to pull them [ the investors] out of reorganization on the
.normal ·basis of a fair plan and then bump them again with an order
under [ the integration section of] the Holding Company Act." 48 It
was perhaps this that had caused Congress to stipulate in section I I (f)
of the Holding Company Act that "In any such [ receivership or
reorganization] proceeding a reorganization plan for a registered holding company or any subsidiary company thereof shall not become effective unless such plan shall have been approved.by the [Securities
and Exchange] Commission after opportunity for hearing prior to its
submission to the court."
It was probably no mere accident that the Utilities Power & Light
Corporation was the first object of the integration hearings of the
S. E. C. Not only did this company represent an extreme type against
which the act was directed, namely, widely scattered and heterogeneous
properties in 580 communities, held together by an unduly complicated
capital structure, but reorganization proceedings (under the old 77B)
were pending. The S. E. C. thought it advantageous to consider both
phases as one related problem.44
The Associated Gas & Electric Corporation was bankrupt. The
Northeastern Water & Electric Corporation, a subsidiary of Associated
but also itself a registered holding company, came before the S. E. C.
as a declarant on another matter. The question arose as to whether the
fact that Associated was within the jurisdiction of the federal court
¼3 N. Y. TIMES, July 21, 1938, p. 25:8. Commissioner Healy, in a concurring
opinion in Matter of Peoples Light & Power Co., 2 S. E. C. 829 at 844 (1937), said:
"In imposing upon this Commission the duty under Section 11 (f) of passing upon
reorganization of registered holding companies and their subsidiaries, Congress recognized that the efforts of the Commission should be coordinated with the work of the
courts in reorganization cases. The objectives of the [Holding Company] Act could
not be achieved if, while the Commission was applying the standards of the Act in
some cases, reorganizations could be effected through the courts without application of
such standards."
44
GuTHMANN and DouGALL, CORPORATE FINANCIAL Poucy 626 (1940).
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gave the court or the commission the power to declare Northeastern
exempt from the Holding Company Act. The S. E. C. maintained that
it still had the "plain statutory duty" to protect the direct public investors of the subsidiaries of a bankrupt holding company and sharply
stated that both it and the bankruptcy courts are bound by the laws of
Congress.45
The federal courts have generally been as sympathetic with the
work of the S. E. C. as they have been with the decisions of the Interstate Commerce Commission in its advisory capacity under section 77.
Circuit Judge Augustus Hand has said:
". . . One of the principal reasons for the creation of such a
bureau [ the S. E. C.] is to secure the benefit of special knowledge
acquired through continuous experience in a difficult and complicated field. Its interpretation of the act should control unless
plainly erroneous. In no other way can the objects of the [bankruptcy] act be attained without constant and disconcerting friction." 46
STERNNESS TEMPERED WITH TOLERANCE AND RESTRAINT

In carrying out its fundamental principles the S. E. C. is frequently
as caustic as the vitriolic schoolmaster. It abruptly told the Atlas Pipeline Corporation that the company might be as well off to quit business
as to continue in operation, especially in view of the prevailing high
prices of scrap iron.47 It accused the National Power & Light Company
of being for many years "little more than a set of books" in the Electric
Bond & Share Company's office 48 and told the San Francisco Bay Toll45

ln the Matter of Northeastern Water & Electric Corp., Holding Company Act
Release No. 2314, October 2, 1940.
46
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Associated Gas & Electric Co., (C. C. A.
2d, 1938) 99 F. (2d) 795 at 798. But see In re Plankinton Building Co., (D. C.
Wis. 1941) 40 F. Supp. 517, where the judge rather arbitrarily raised a valuation fixed
by the S. E. C. in advance of and separate from consideration of a plan of reorganization.
47
In the Matter of Atlas Pipeline Corp., Corp. Reorg. Release No. 42, June 7,
1941.
48
This refers to the period up to I 93 5. Shortly after the passage of the Public
Utility Holding Company Act in that year, the Electric Bond & Share Company let
National Power & Light have a few separate officials and employees and an office of its
own, in order that it might have, as the S. E. C. put it, "a semblance of function";
but the S. E. C. sharply concluded that the company was being used solely as a pyramiding device in the Electric Bond & Share system and under § II (b )( 2) of the Holding
Company Act should cease its existence. The proceedings abounded with sarcasm.
When, for instance, the National Power & Light Company stated that it had rendered
a service in lending money to some of its subsidiaries, the S. E. C. retorted that
"Doubtless any commercial bank would have done as much, and probably at a lower
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Bridge Company that the company would be bankrupt after the consummation of the proposed reorganization plan, just as it was before.49
The S. E. C. pungently charged the trustees and committees for
the Genesee Valley Gas Company with bringing in a plan which was
merely an "incubator for future reorganizations." The Pavilion Natural
Gas Company, with earnings of $83,000, furnished 92% of the income
of its holding company, the Genesee Valley Gas Company, Inc. The
Pavilion Company had calculated the difference between the amount
in its depreciation reserve at the end of 1926 and the amount which.
would have accrued at the rate of 12½ % of gross revenues from January 1, 1907 to December 31, 1926. This difference of $196,000 was
transferred from the reserve to the earned surplus account. With certain other adjustments, these manipulations changed the corporate surplus from a deficit of $112,000 to a credit of $101,000. This transfer
was made without the consent of the stockholders or directors of
Pavilion and without the approval of the New York Public Service
Commission, which authorization is required by law.
The Genesee Company now came into a reorganization court. The
plan provided that the first lien 6% bonds amounting to $733,000 be
rate of interest." In the Matter of Electric Bond & Share Co., Holding Company
Act Release No. 2962, August 23, 1941, p. 27.
49
The San Francisco Bay Toll-Bridge Company had outstanding $4,303,000 of
6¼% first mortgage bonds and $2,000,000 of 7% debenture bonds. Without making provision for extraordinary repairs or maintenance, the S. E. C. estimated that the
maximum annual net earnings of the company would be about $220,000. These discounted at 8% would give a present worth of $2,590,000. (The franchise expires in
1977, at which time the bridge and approaches will become a free public highway.)
The reorganization plan provided for the issuance of $4,303,000 new 3% income
bonds, plus 2 shares of new common stock for each $ 1 ooo bond, to the holders of the
$4,303,000 of 6,¼ % first mortgage bonds. The total shares of common stock would
thus be 8606, all going to the first mortgage holders. The old debentures were to be
cancelled by a 1_¼% cash payment, there being about $53,000 of current assets not
subject to the mortgage to which the debenture holders might legally have a claim with
the first mortgage holders. The old preferred and common stockholders were to
receive nothing. This was fair and equitable, said the S. E. C., because the stockholders
had no valuable equity in the company.
But, said the S. E. C., the plan is not feasible, because the company would still
be bankrupt. The face value of the bonds would be considerably in excess of the most
optimistic estimate as to the value of the property. The interest on these bonds would,
it is true, be covered almost twice in the best year. But the rate was set at an unreal
figure in view of the risk involved. If the rate were, say 6%, the interest requirements
would not be met. The fixing of the interest rate at 3 %, concluded the S. E. C., was
merely a device to make the plan appear feasible when it really was not. The first plan
of reorganization for the company had been disapproved and this, the second, was also
sent back for reconsideration. In the Matter of San Francisco Bay Toll-Bridge Co.,
Corp. Reorg. Release No. 32, July 25, 1940.
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undisturbed and that the other securities and obligations, including
$283,500 of debentures plus accrued interest of $ro9,147.50, be exchanged for new common stock. The old stockholders were to share in
the reorganization, and the effect of the plan was such that 48.6% of
the voting control would be in the hands of the public and 5 I .4% in the
hands of the old management. The value of the assets was :fixed at
$991,060. The S. E. C. said this plan was not fair and equitable; there
was nothing for the stockholders and they should not be allowed to
participate. Furthermore, since there was not enough to pay off all the
creditors, the plan was also inequitable even among them.
The plan was also unsound, said the S. E. C. in no uncertain terms.
Earnings, mainly the $83,000 from Pavilion, would not furnish an unusually good coverage for the interest on the $733,000 of bonds. But,
suppose the Pavilion Company should be required to "put back" the depreciation reserve over even a period of years. In such case, it probably
could not pay the usual dividends to the Genesee Company. Thus, the
position of the :first lien bonds was insecure. The plan was merely a
"coloration of reorganization." 50
While the Schoolmaster has had frequent occasion to crack down,
particularly when someone tries to bluff or pull the wool over his eyes,
the decisions and opinions abound with illustrations of moderation,
:flexibility and tolerance. "The situation is far from ideal, but there are
certain circumstances which must be considered" is a common type of
expression. In rare instances the S. E. C. has even made an exception
to the absolute priority rule. Where there is reasonable chance that
future earnings may exceed expectations; 51 or where there are contingent resources such as probable proceeds of a pending lawsuit by the
corporation; or when there are certain assets on which the excluded
security holders may have a legal claim; or in one case where the good
will of the stockholders who are employees 52 was desirable; or where
50

In the Matter of Genesee Valley Gas Co., Holding Company Act Release No.
981, January 24, 1938, p. 7. The S. E. C. also pointed out that the Pavilion Company
might have to increase its regular depreciation and maintenance rates, thus further
reducing its possible dividend payments to Genesee.
51
This would, however, tend to lower the interest rate used for capitalization purposes and therefore raise the value of the plant, and hence there may be no question of
an exception to the rule.
52
The S. E. C. permitted the plan of United Telephone & Electric Co. to give
a small amount of new stock to the old stockholders who were employees ("operating
men") of the subsidiaries of the reorganized company. z LA. L. REV. 693 at 703
(1940), citing In the Matter of United Telephone & Electric Co., Holding Company
Act Release No. u87, August 5, 1938.
In Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U. S. 106, 60 S. Ct. I
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the participation given is very small and goes to the holders exclusive
of the holding company; 58 or where there is a real argument as to
whether the'security in question has any book value, the S. E. C. has
allowed ·old security holders to participate in the reorganization even
though they had no measurable equity. A small amount of direct participation in the form of actual stock may be allotted to them, or the
participation may be indirect in the form of stock purchase warrants.
Special circumstances may compel an exception to the absolute
priority rule. Neither the owners of the debenture bonds nor the preferred or common stockholders of the Detroit International Bridge
Company had any real equity in the company, as the entire assets were
worth only a fraction of the first mortgage bonds. It was desirable to
have the cooperation of the debenture holders so as to keep them from
foreclosing. Foreclosure would mean the elimination of the Canadian
subsidiary which it seemed desirable to preserve. So, the S. E. C.
allowed the debenture holders directly to participate in the new company. The plan allocated stock purchase warrants to the common and
preferred stockholders in order to induce them to consent to charter
amendments. This would avoid the necessity of forming a new corporation and escape possible difficulties which might arise in the course of
transferring the bridge franchises to a new company.54
While the S. E. C. has, as a rule, been fair and tolerant, it has been
(1939), the Supreme Court of the United States held that the old management could
not share in the reorganization plan where the stockholders had no equity merely because their financial standing and familiarity with the business would be valuable to
the company. This advantage is too intangible and ephemeral, said the Court, and is
not a "balance sheet asset." Whether this same principle would be applied in the case
of "operating men" is a question not yet decided.
53
In the Matter of Mountain States Power Co., 5 S. E. C. l (1939). See also
In the Matter of Bondholders' Committee for West Ohio Gas Co., 3 S. E. C. 1014
(1938), where the amount of participation was small and the equity of the security
holders in question was "very little, if any." The S. E. C. points out also (p. 1027)
that in this situation the "value is affected by contingencies to a greater degree than
in most utility cases."
54
In the Matter of Detroit International Bridge Co., Corp. Reorg. Release No. 9,
March 24, 1939. An additional reason for allowing the debenture holders to participate
was the fact that certain property taxes had remained unpaid during the pendency of a
tax controversy and the debenture holders asserted a claim to a proportionate share of
this cash. The reorganized company was to issue only common stock. Of this, 207,648
shares were to be issued on the basis of 16 shares for each $ 1000 mortgage bond and
2 shares for each $1000 debenture. The balance of the total of 217,175 shares was to
be held against the exercise of the warrants. Since the warrants named a price which
was about twice the market value of the new common stock, the S. E. C. suggested that
they had no real value and that, to protect purchasers less, well advised, it might be well
to restrict the transferability of the warrants.
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careful not to become sentimental. In both reorganization and integration proceedings, the S. E. C. has placed emphasis upon the future of
the company rather than upon the preservation of often worthless
investments, upon rehabilitation rather than a mere redistribution of
new securities among the old holders. It does not attempt "fireside
equity." "We cannot create value where none exists" was the answer
to pleading security owners of the Utilities Power and Light.5 5 The
class A, the class B, and the common stockholders were found to have
no equity in the assets and were not allowed to participate in the reorganization. To the pleas of some of these holders that they had made
a large investment in the original purchase of their securities, the
S. E. C. retorted: "We cannot ... be sympathetic at the expense of other
people's money and prior claims. . . . nor can we sanction the allocation of anything of value to stockholders junior to the old preferred
stock so long as the latter's preferential rights remain largely unsatisfied." 56
The original plan had provided that stock purchase rights be given
to the new preferred and common stock allocated to the former prior
claimants. The old class A and B and the common stockholders, though
possessing no equity, were to have a chance to purchase those shares not
taken under their rights by the new stockholders. This would seem to
be merely a charitable concession to the relative priorities rule so as to
permit the old stockholders to pick up crumbs not wanted by someone else.
The S. E. C. frowned upon such privilege. The gift of a stock right is
quite di:fferent from that of a crumb of bread. The exercise of such
rights by a stranger, even though the persons entitled to them did not
do so, might dilute the equity of the new stock. Furthermore, if the
old stockholders were ever able to sell the rights so received, they
would obtain value at the expense of the old prior claimants. If there
were some doubt as to whether these old A, B and common stockholders had an equity or if there were some showing of value, these
warrants might be issued. But the facts clearly indicated that there was
no equity whatever remaining for these old security holders.
Perhaps the Schoolmaster was a little punitive and inclined to drive
home a lesson. Much of the A and B and common stock of the old
55

In the Matter of Utilities Power & Light Corp., 5 S. E. C. 483 at SIi (1939).
Id. at 510, 5II. Federal Judge Holly in passing on the Utilities Power &
Light plan expressed great regret at the loss to the A, B, and common stockholders, but
made it clear that "the injustice from which these investors are suffering is not the
work of the sponsors of the plan, nor of the court nor the Commission which approve it,
but the promoters who issued and marketed the stock." In re Utilities Power & Light
Corp., (D. C. Ill. 1939) 29 F. Supp. 763 at 771.
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corporation had been issued for highly speculative purchases at inflated
:figures. From r928 to r937 its earnings had been swelled by manipulation of the accounts of its subsidiaries, by the payment by these subsidiaries of too high dividends, and by excess service charges.
The Schoolmaster has refused to be hurried. The S. E. C. points
out that the Public Utility Holding Company Act was the result of at
least seven years of intensive government research and much priyate
study. All this research was done largely to determine the nature of the
trouble and to make general recommendations.
But the enforcement of the "great grandfather clause," for instance,
is vastly more complex than the preliminary problem of investigation.
The equitable breaking up of a holding company pyramid may be more
difficult than its original erection. The parts are often tied together in
an elaborate way, and the breaking up of one segment may affect relationships in the same framework or even in other systems. The Interstate Commerce Commission has made little progress in railroad consolidation after twenty years of effort. Even allowing for the broader
and more compulsory powers exercised by the S. E. C., it is probable
that the satisfactory simplification and integration of our utilities will
require several decades.
The S. E. C. has refused, therefore, to be goaded by its critics into
a snap obedience to and enforcement of section r r (a) requiring the
commission to study all the registered holding company systems and to
determine how they may be simplified, integrated and democratized.
It has made some advance advisory decisions and is working on tentative integration plans for each major system. But the Schoolmaster is
wary of "trick questions" and frequently exercises the prerogative of
postponing discussion and settlement of certain questions until a better
perspective is available.111
117
The following represents a common type of problem: In Matter of United
Light & Power Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 2636, March 20, 1941, the
companies made certain suggestions to transfer two subsidiaries to another company in
the system and to transfer the Point Pleasant Co. outside the system. The S. E. C.
said that, while these actions might seem to satisfy the "great grandfather clause" or
"death sentence," "we hesitate to direct the taking of such action at this time by reason
of the fact that as a result of the further proceedings to be had thereon it may turn out
, that other holding companies in the system represent unnecessary complexities and may
need to be eliminated. Should that be the case, the action suggested with respect to
the Maryville and Point Pleasant companies might be unnecessary."
Justice Douglas, as chairman of the S. E. C., defined an integrated public utility
as one "whose plants are physically connected, or can be, and which normally can be
economically operated as a unit in a single area and not so large as to impair the
advantages of localized mangement, efficient operation or the eff'ecti'l'eness of regulation." This definition, most of which is quoted from the Holding Company Act, gives
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The S. E. C. has taken a long-term point of view with an eye on the
future. In its decisions it has not hesitated to indicate the possible e:ffects
of contemplated provisions. For instance, the reorganization plan of
LaFrance Industries contemplated the issuance of preferred stock
carrying a rate of six per cent. No dividends were to be paid on this
preferred stock during the life of a R. F. C. loan, which would probably be five years. This would mean an arrearage of at least thirty per
cent. This is unsound, said the S. E. C., for "Experience shows that in
such situations removal of the burden of the arrearages through some
form of recapitalization plan has often been necessary." 58 Its decisions
abound with statements of this kind.
Similarly, the S. E. C. attempts to watch the social trends. The
Indianapolis Power & Light Company 59 was permitted to issue common
stock to the public at $24 per share ($22 to the underwriters). The
commission called attention to the fact that "security dealers in Indiana will have an ample opportunity to obtain all the stock they can
sell in Indiana. This will repatriate the holdings of stock to the extent
that the residents of Indiana may wish to purchase the stock." Though
it does not represent a condition for the issuance of the stock, this comment is interesting. Does the dictum indicate that the S. E. C. is eman idea of the difficulties which are met in the solution of the simplification and integration problems. See also comment in 36 MICH. L. REv. 1360 (1938). Since the
"forms of control" are numerous, it is frequently difficult to determine whether a company is a holding company and whether a corporation is "subject to controlling influence." The term "controlling influence," which is important in the determination
of the presence or absence of arms-length relations in the sale of securities, as well as
in the definition of "holding company'' has been so vaguely and variously defined by
the S. E. C. as to "tempt'' one law writer to venture that perhaps a controlling influence
is "whatever the S. E. C. says it is." See 40 MICH. L. REv. 274 at 283 (1941).
Some idea of the time involved in dissolution proceedings may be gathered from
the following: In May, 1940, the S. E. C. proceeded against Electric Bond & Share and
various of its subsidiaries under section II (b )( 2) of the Holding Company Act. On
August 23, 1941, the S. E. C. ordered the dissolution of National Power & Light.
On December 26, 1941, the S. E. C. passed on one step in a plan of dissolution submitted by National. Some testimony indicated that the liquidation program contemplated would require one to two years for complete effectuation. Holding Company
Act Release No. 32n, December 26, 1941. Thus the complete program of dissolution
in the case of National Power & Light may easily require four years from the official
beginning of the proceedings.
58
In the Matter of La France Industries, Corp. Reorg. Release No. 16, September 1, 1939, p. 19.
59
In the Matter of Charles True Adams, Trustee of the Estate of Utilities Power
& Light Corp., Holding Company Act Release No. 2001, April 2, 1940 (quotation from
p. 6).
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phasizing local ownership of utility securities, with a management that
is not only "close to the rails," but also close to the neighbors?
The S. E. C. also in its report called attention to a private statistical
study which pointed out that if Indianapolis Power & Light can sell
common stock, at least one-half of the public utility companies in the
country are in as good or better credit condition and can also issue
common stock under similar or better terms. 00
The S. E. C. has become a strong advocate of common stock financing by both holding and operating companies. It has frequently pointed
out that the utilities, like the railroads, 61 have had too·great a faith in
the permanence of existing facilities, and have regarded their obligations, not as something to be paid off when they fall due, but rather
to be refunded or renewed. 62
Then, also, there is the question of maturities. So much refunding
has been done in the past few years that, according to one study 63 cited
by the commission, of the total utility debt in the United States forty
per cent falls due in the five years from 1965 to 1969 and more than
00
The Indianapolis Power & Light common stock was oversubscribed more than
two times in less than two hours. Ethridge, "Administrative Policy Toward Security
Issues under the Public Utility Holding Company Acts," 13 Miss. L. J. 166 at 182,
note 41 (1941).
61
The S. E. C. said in Matter of El Paso Electric Co., Holding Company Act
Release No. 2535, February 4, 1941 (pp. 25-26, 20): "The truth, disclosed by railroad financial history, is that it was usually when interest rates were low and debt
financing was used (because it was, in short-run terms, attractive to the owners of the
controlling stock), that further common stock financing on the most favorable terms
was also possible. The railroads let the chance to do common stock financing go by,
and when later it became impossible to do debt financing, common stock financing was
also impossible. The time to do common stock financing is usually the very time when
debt financing on easy terms is available. To postpone common stock financing at such
times means, too often, that it never will be done. The argument as to the 'expense'
of raising money through the sale of common stock is thus, very often, an argument
against ever doing adequate comm.on stock financing. . . .
"The dangers of perpetuating a high proportion of debt are well illustrated by
the experience of great railroad systems in recent years-experiences which might in
many respects have been avoided by financing through a g-reater proportion of equity
securities."
62
A significant observation is found in a dictum by District Judge Symes in Re
Denver & R. G. W.R. R., (D. C. Colo. 1940) 38 F. Supp. 106 at 114: "There is
much justification, therefore, for the observation by writers on the subject that a fixed
interest bond is not really a binding promise to pay the principal and interest of the
bond, but contains an implied option in favor of the railroad borrower to pay the bondholder with a junior bond and some stock in place of cash perhaps in a reorganized
company. So that a railroad bond therefore becomes merely a claim to a portion of the
income and corpus of the property that takes precedence over the claims of other
creditors."
~s 21 SAVINGS BANK J. 40 (May, 1940).
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one-half in the decade from 1961 to 1970. This inadequate diversification of maturity dates may become a source of great danger in the
utility industry.
The advocacy by the Schoolmaster of the principle of equity financing may appear to be of the lip service variety. Ninety-five per cent
of the securities issued by public utilities from 1935 to 1940 have been
bonds and notes. Common stock issues have been extremely rare.
Whether this condition represents the pedagogical weakness and inability to practice what one teaches, or whether it is the result of our
federal tax laws which allow interest but not dividends to be deductions
in the computation of corporate net income, is a question outside the
scope of the present study.
It has been estimated that when the integration and simplification
program is completed, more than one-half 64 of the operating companies
will be so owned and operated as to be exempt from most of the S. E. C.
regulations. The commission is in danger of placing so much emphasis
upon its position as a Monsieur le Paris for uneconomic holding companies that it may neglect the larger problem of the future organization
and operation of the public utility industry.
The young commission is taking its duties seriously. The Schoolmaster "grades his papers" rapidly. The customary elapsed time, for
instance, between the reference by the federal court of a plan of reorganization to the S. E. C. and the report by that body is one to two
months. 65 It has frequently stated that in the public interest it will,
wherever the law permits, carefully scrutinize every plan of reorganization and every issue of securities within its jurisdiction, regardless of
64
Blum, "SEC Integration of Holding Company Systems," I 7 J. LAND & PuB.
UTIL. EcoN., 421 at 438, note 52 (1941), citing NEw YoRK TIMES, August 31, 1941,
(§ 3, pp. l :7, 6:3-5) •
65
Actually the work of the S. E. C. on a reorganization case covers a much longer
time than this. Early in the proceedings trustees are appointed. One of their functions
is to draw up a plan of reorganization for filing with the court. Even before the appointment of such trustees, various committees of the security holders may have had
frequent conferences to attempt to agree on a plan for submission to the trustee. These
recommendations, with those of others interested, are then laid before the trustees.
If the case is one in which the S. E. C. appears to have advisory jurisdiction, its representatives are very active all along, making suggestions or even submitting a plan. Frequent conferences may then be held between the trustees and the parties interested,
including the S. E. C. After these often prolonged sessions, the trustees prepare a plan,
which is submitted to the court. Modifications may be made at the suggestion of the
court. In due course the court refers the plan to the S. E. C. for an advisory report.
This advisory report is generally made in one to two months. See Gerdes, "Recent
Developments in Corporate Reorganizations under the Bankruptcy Act," 26 VA. L.
REV. 999 (1940).
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whether complaint is made by any of the interested parties. It is taking
advantage of the relatively great freedom and :flexibility of administrative procedure to dip into all angles of a case, even following up
hearsay, rumors, and insinuations.
In accordance with this freedom, the Schoolmaster has the inclination and finds the time to describe the basic operations of the companies
with which the decisions are concerned. The reader of the S. E. C.
opinions and decisions gets a picture of the complex capital structures
of the utility holding company systems and the financial and accounting
manipulations behind the troubles of McKesson and Robbins. He
learns of industrial processes, from flour milling to lumbering and the
problems of the department store. He becomes acquainted with the
causes of the failure of an international bridge and the difficulties of an
investing company.
Occasionally, the Schoolmaster becomes enthusiastic and makes a
long excursion into and writes a chapter on some legal problem such as
stare decisis, or a political problem such as the historical background of
a law of Congress, or a financial question such as bonds versus stocks in
financing, protective devices for preferred stock, or the pegging and
stabilizing of security prices. 66
Sometimes, indeed, the Schoolmaster even calls a special "review
session." Most of the chairmen and several of the other members of the
S. E. C. have been active in making appeals or speeches to specialized
groups, sometimes even requesting the privilege of appearing on the
program. Chairman Douglas was a master at this phase. Many of his
utterances as a chairman of the commission find expression in his book
Democracy and Finance. Some of his ideas are now taking further
form in opinions for the United States Supreme Court.
Though they do not follow the rule of stare decisis as closely as do
the courts, administrative commissions in general tend to consider themselves bound by their own previous decisions. But administrative commissions, as well as courts, sometimes find they have erred in previous
decisions.
The most famous illustration of such act of self-correction by the
S. E. C. is that found in the El Paso case. In passing on issues of securi- ·
ties by public utility companies under the provisions of the Holding
66
Often these are in the form of an appendix to a regular decision. Frequently,
also, a minority of the commission will yield to the temptation to philosophize in somewhat the same way as Justices Brandeis and Holmes long enriched the records of the
United States Supreme Court. Numerous special reports separate from decisions have,
of course, also been issued by the S. E. C.
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Company Act, the S. E. C. has generally been less particular in inspecting refunding proposals than new money issues. Refunding bonds carried a lower rate of interest than the issues they replaced and therefore
the very process of refunding improved the financial position of the
corporation, was the argument.
The commission admitted that it had been wrong in interpreting
section 7(d) of the act and announced a change of policy in language
which reveals a rare degree of intellectual honesty. The opinion was
careful to state that since the El Paso Company had probably relied
upon the earlier decisions, the change would be applicable only to future
financing. The S. E. C. then described its future general policy as follows: "A refunding of outstanding senior securities where the issuer has
a high ratio of debt to net property or where the security issue does not •
fully meet the standard of section 7(d) will not be permitted effectiveness merely because it is refunding."
"It would be small consolation to investors, consumers and the general public," said the commission, "to be told that top-heavy capital
structures were not created under the Commission administration of
the Holding Company Act, but were only perpetuated under it because
of hesitancy on the Commission's part to act." 67
In its emphasis upon the possible future consequences of present
actions and trends lies the greatest work of the Securities and Exchange
Commission. In its typically aggressive and sympathetic and forthright
and at the same time somewhat erratic and impatient way it has insisted
upon full and accurate disclosure in corporate statements, discouraged
sham and subterfuge,68 improved financial standards, aided in the reconstruction of embarrassed companies, compelled the simplification and
democratization of artificially grown utility systems, and pointed to
dangers in present actions and trends. The new Schoolmaster is neither
Jeremiah nor Pollyanna. He is realistic and is determined that the
future of finance shall not become the mere past again. Most of the
principles he has enunciated have appeared in text books, but in his
hands they have received concrete application and acquired new weight
and dignity.
67
In the Matter of El Paso Electric Co., Holding Company Act Release No.
2535, February 4, 1941, pp. 13, 22 (italics the commission's).
68
It has not seemed desirable here to discuss the application made by the S. E. C.
of the "instrumentality rule.,, By this principle is meant the tendency on the part
of the courts and occasionally by the S. E. C. to disregard the corporate entity where a
large or dominant stockholder or holding company uses a corporation which he or it
controls merely as an "alter ego,, without any real entity or effective existence of its own.

